Lecture 9
 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis

Lecture 9 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis

Author: William Sheppard June 4, 2018 Duration: 1:12:52
We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis.

Ever wondered how the strategies behind a high-stakes poker game, a political campaign, and a corporate merger might actually be connected? Yale Open Courses ECON 159: Game Theory, presented by William Sheppard, pulls back the curtain on the fascinating science of strategic decision-making. This isn't just an academic lecture series; it's a deep dive into the frameworks that explain how we interact when our choices directly impact others. Each episode unpacks core concepts-from Nash equilibrium and backward induction to credibility and signaling-using clear explanations that make these powerful ideas accessible. You’ll hear these theories brought to life through engaging examples that stretch far beyond textbook economics. Discussions might pivot from classic parlor games to analysis drawn from film narratives, historical events, and current political dilemmas, showing just how pervasive strategic thinking is in our world. The content is drawn directly from the renowned Yale College course, capturing the dynamic atmosphere of a campus classroom. For anyone curious about the hidden rules of competition and cooperation in everyday life, this podcast serves as a compelling guide. Tune in to train your mind to see the strategic layers in everything from simple interactions to complex global systems.
Author: Language: English Episodes: 24

Yale Open Courses ECON 159: Game Theory
Podcast Episodes
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